Miruvor v. National
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Note: in a judgement given on 21 February 2003, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal upheld the decision at first instance on the 'election' point but overruled the judge at first instance on the Cl.16.1 point. For a note on the Court of Appeal decision, click here DMC/INS/11/02
This case is contributed by Mary Thomson, previously member of the firm of Paul Hastings/Koo and Partners, former International Contributors for Hong Kong DMC Category Rating: Developed Facts
Miruvor claimed on the all risk marine insurance incorporating the Institute Cargo Clauses (A). The insurer, National, refused payment. It maintained that cover had terminated before the time at which the loss occurred. National’s argument was that the storage in the bonded warehouse was at Miruvor’s election and was "other than in the ordinary course of transit", within the meaning of Clause 8.1.2.1.1 Miruvor had chosen to keep the goods in the bonded warehouse, not only for custom’s clearance but also for extended storage until the buyer eventually made payment for the goods. National relied on evidence that Miruvor was aware, from previous shipments to the buyer, that there were likely to be substantial delays in payment. Even though there was only one customs warehouse in both Santos and Paranagua, it was Miruvor’s ‘use’ of the warehouse for the purpose of storage pending payment that constituted an ‘election’ for ‘storage other than in the ordinary course of transit’. National’s second argument was that Miruvor had not taken reasonable measures to avert or minimise its loss, as required under the Minimising Losses clauses of the policy2. This duty, it was argued, required Miruvor to travel to Paraguay and obtain whatever legal practical assistance it could in order to avoid any further theft of the cargoes after it had knowledge of what was happening, including, if necessary, a court ordered injunction against release of the remaining cargoes. 1. DURATION
2. MINIMISING LOSSES
Judgment
On the Minimizing Losses defence, the judge held that the requirement to enjoin the release by judicial means was to pitch the assured’s obligation too high. However, after knowledge of the facts has come to the assured, there is a duty to at least communicate to the carrier in order to prevent release, even if it proves to be unsuccessful or is expected to be so. The judge relied on the observation of Everleigh J in ICS v BTI (1984) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 154 that the words of section 78 (4) of the Marine Insurance Act (mirroring Clause 16.1 of ICC(A)) impose "a duty to act in circumstances where a reasonable man intent upon preserving his property, as opposed to claiming upon insurers, would act." Miruvor attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to prevent the release of one of its cargoes by a fax message to the carrier. However, its failure to send a specific fax in relation to a subsequent shipment was held to be a failure ‘to take such measures as may be reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimizing such loss’ and therefore a breach of Clause 16.1. Miruvor was allowed recovery under the former but not the latter shipment.
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