Sumitomo v. Alexandrea

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DMC/SandT/26/02
Sumitomo Corporation (Singapore) Pte Ltd v The Owners of the Ship "Alexandrea"
Singapore High Court: Belinda Ang Saw Ean, JC: [2002] 3 SLR 56: 23 April 2002
Khattar Wong & Partners, for Sumitomo
Steven Lee, Dason & Partners, for "Alexandrea"
SUPPLY OF CONTAMINATED BUNKERS BY BUNKER TANKER: WHETHER ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION MAY BE INVOKED FOR A CLAIM IN NEGLIGENCE AGAINST BUNKER TANKER: WHETHER CLAIM FALLS WITHIN SECTIONS 3(1)(l) AND 4(4) HIGH COURT (ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION) ACT OF SINGAPORE
Summary
Sumitomo was an intermediate party in a chain of contracts for the supply of marine fuel oil ("MFO"). Sumitomo brought an action in rem against the bunker tanker "ALEXANDREA" for negligence in supplying contaminated MFO to a ship "FRONT MELODY". The issue arose whether admiralty jurisdiction had been improperly invoked. The court held that it had; the ship referred to in s.4(4) must be the same ship as that referred to in s.3(1). In this case, the ships were different.

This case note has been supplied by Ang and Partners, the International Contributors for Singapore

Facts
Sumitomo was an intermediate party in a chain of contracts for the supply of marine fuel oil ("MFO"). The MFO was ultimately supplied by the owners of the bunker tanker "ALEXANDREA" to the ship "FRONT MELODY" in Singapore. The MFO was contaminated and affected the performance of the machinery of "FRONT MELODY". Sumitomo was not a direct contracting party with either the owners of "ALEXANDREA" or the owners of "FRONT MELODY", but was exposed to a claim by its immediate buyer, resulting from the loss or damage suffered by "FRONT MELODY". Sumitomo brought an action in rem against "ALEXANDREA" in negligence and arrested the bunker tanker, claiming an indemnity against any eventual liability to its immediate buyer.

"ALEXANDREA" applied for the warrant of arrest to be set aside on two grounds: first, that the admiralty jurisdiction under section 4(4) of the High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act (the "Act") had been improperly invoked; second, that there was material non-disclosure in Sumitomo’s affidavit leading to the warrant of arrest. "ALEXANDREA" claimed damages for wrongful arrest. The assistant registrar (at first instance) dismissed the application and "ALEXANDREA" appealed to the High Court.

The main issues to be determined by the High Court were

• Whether Sumitomo’s claim framed in negligence fell within the scope of section 3(1)(l) of the Act; and
• Whether the claim arose in connection with a ship under section 4(4) of the Act.

The relevant provisions of the Act read as follows
"3. The admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court shall be as follows, that is to say, jurisdiction to hear and determine any of the following questions or claims….
(l) any claim in respect of goods or materials supplied to a ship for her operation or maintenance;
4(4) In the case of any such claim as mentioned in section 3(1)(d) to (q), being a claim arising in connection with a ship, where the person who would be liable on the claim in an action in personam was, when the cause of action arose, the owner or charterer of, or in possession or in control of, the ship, the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court may (whether the claim gives rise to a maritime lien on the ship or not) be involved by an action in rem against
(a) that ship, if at the time when the action is brought it is beneficially owned as respects all the shares therein by that person; or
(b) any other ship which, at the time when the action is brought, is beneficially owned as aforesaid."

Judgment
1. The Court rejected a concession given by counsel for "ALEXANDREA" that Sumitomo’s claim for negligence fell within the scope of section 3(1)(l) of the Act because the concession was misplaced. The Court would clearly be acting without jurisdiction if the claim did not satisfy the basic condition for jurisdiction.

2. The words " in respect of" in section 3(1)(l) of the Act imported a broad rather than a restrictive meaning. The ordinary and natural meaning of the words used in section 3(1)(l) was wide enough to cover claims framed in tort but only where the wrongdoing related to or was referable to the primary ship supplied with goods or materials for her operation or maintenance. Sumitomo’s claim for negligence did not fall within section 3(1)(l). As to the types of cases in tort that could be covered under this provision, each case would be required to be decided on its own facts.

3. Even if Sumitomo’s claim fell within section 3(1)(l), it did not come within section 4(4) of the Act. The Court held that "a ship" in the phrase "being a claim arising in connection with a ship" in section 4(4) is the same ship to which goods or materials were supplied in section 3(1)(l). In this case, "ALEXANDREA" was not the ship to which goods or materials were supplied in section 3(1)(l) (that ship was "FRONT MELODY"). Therefore, "ALEXANDREA" was not the ship in connection with which the claim arose for the purpose of section 4(4).

4. As the Court’s conclusions on sections 3(1)(l) and 4(4) were sufficient to dispose of the appeal, it was unnecessary to decide on the alleged material non-disclosure.

5. The application by "ALEXANDREA" for damages for wrongful arrest was dismissed as there was no evidence to show that the arrest was malicious.

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