RNLI said that, under s.190 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, the claim was brought out of time. That section sets a time limit of two years ‘from the date the injury was suffered’ for bringing proceedings to enforce any claim for ‘damages for …personal injury caused by the fault of [a] ship to any person on board another ship.’ RNLI submitted that the injury in respect of which Sweet claimed was suffered on the date of the collision.

The psychiatrist's report relied on by Sweet indicated that symptoms had first become apparent one month after the accident. However, Sweet submitted that he did not suffer recognised psychiatric injury until September 1999, when he was diagnosed as having anxiety, leading to his retirement on the grounds of ill health in March 2000. Since the law afforded a remedy only in respect of a recognised psychiatric injury (McLoughlin v. O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, Sweet submitted that, on that basis and on the proper construction of s.190 (3)(b) of the 1995 Act, the claim was brought in time.

1. The judge noted that Section 190 of the 1995 Act was drafted in a different way to its predecessor, s.8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911. Section 190(3)(a) of the 1995 Act, which dealt with damage to ships and property, provided that time ran from the date when the damage or loss was caused whereas s.190 (3)(b), which dealt with loss of life or personal injury, provided that time ran from the date when the loss of life or injury was suffered. He held that Parliament must be taken to have dealt with the two cases differently, advisedly and for a purpose. Furthermore s.190 (3)(b) did envisage that there might be cases where the appropriate date from which time ran was not the date on which the causal event occurred. "… it could well occur that a person sustains injuries in the course of a collision … from which he later dies. In such a case… time would run from the date of death, not from the date of sustaining the injury which caused death." Parliament must be taken by the form of s.190 (3)(b) expressly to have provided for cases where the loss of life, or suffering of injury, was not in time coincidental with the causative maritime incident. That approach was consistent with the fact that a person had no cause of action until and unless he was suffering from a recognisable psychiatric condition.

2.The judge then examined in some detail the four reports of the psychiatrist who had examined Sweet. He found that the reports were confusing and contradictory on the issue of when a specific disorder first occurred.

3. In this situation and given that RNLI had adduced no evidence, the judge held that it would not be right to strike out the claim as time barred in the circumstances ‘where the evidence on which I must deduce that conclusion is so contradictory. On the other hand I cannot, on the claimant’s own untested written evidence, safely conclude that he first suffered a recognisable psychiatric injury as late as September 1999." Accordingly, this was an issue that must be tried and RNLI’s’ application to strike out the proceedings was therefore dismissed.